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ISSN 0455 - 0420I. The Gap between Western and Eastern Europe
1. Since 1985, the economic landscape of Europe has changed considerably, both in
the West and in the East. In Western Europe, the Delors initiative for Europe '92,
which started in 1985 with the White Book covering 300 single steps, has given
new momentum to the EC. The liberalization of capital flows and services, replacing
the unanimity rule in the Council of Ministers by majority voting in a weighted
form for the larger part of the 300 directives, and the Cassis-de-Dijon ruling,
which was handed down by the European Court of Justice, will reduce market
segmentation and will lead to a more intense economic and political integration.
According to the Cassis-de-Dijon ruling, a product legally brought to market in
one of the EC countries can automatically enter the markets in the other countries.
The principle of mutual recognition of national rules will also be applied to the
service industries. This principle constitutes institutional competition among na-
tional regulations. Arbitrage by consumers and firms will take advantage of dif-
ferences in national regulations and these regulations will have to adjust. In-
stitutional competition is a vehicle by which national market segmentation will be
broken up. Together with the four freedoms of movement - for people, goods,
services and factors of production - institutional competition represents an in-
stitutional innovation for Western Europe.
Institutional competition in Western Europe and the Delors-initiative have stimulated
the imagination in Europe, and they have already contributed to an increase in
investment activity, including the reorganization of firms and the relocation of
some of their plants. This positive development in Western Europe has had a
strong attraction for Eastern European Countries. The Eastern European develop-
ment might not have taken place if Latin America had been Eastern Europe's neigh-
bor.
2. While Western Europe has gained new economic momentum, Eastern Europe has
experienced the Orwellian crisis of central planning and socialism. The planning
system has proven to be completely inefficient and unable to provide enough goods
Opening lecture of a series on "The New Economic Landscape of Europe" at the
Rijksuniversiteit Gent, November 21, 1990, in the context of the "Vereniging
voor Economie" -Chair sponsored by the four Flemish Universities Antwerpen,
Brussels, Gent and Leuven in winter semester 1990/91.for people. Except for the privileged nomenklatura, the target of equality seemed
to be realized - albeit on a very low level. As Churchill once remarked, "The
inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings, the inherent virtue
of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries. "
The political demand for individual freedom and open societies, for a social market
economy and democracy, and for a new orientation of economic, social and political
life is sweeping away old and rigid structures and changing the institutional
setting of the Eastern European scenery. Starting in Poland and Hungary, the new
political demand has extended to the Baltic States, East Germany and Czecho-
slovakia. Last but not least, the necessity of an institutional reform is apparent
for the USSR.
3. 1985 - the year of the White Book in Western Europe - is also the year of
Gorbachev. He must have recognized that the status of the USSR as a developing
country - as Helmut Schmidt once remarked, an Upper Volta with atomic weapons -
had to be changed. 1985 was thus an important caesura both in the West and in
the East, and it will be an important year in the history books.
The feature common to the development in all Eastern European countries is the
failure of the central planning approach and the need for decentralization. The
requirement of a new economic institutional arrangement goes hand in hand with
the political demand for individual rights and democratic forms of government. The
communist parties have lost their political power in Poland, Hungary, East Germany
and Czechoslovakia. We are witnesses of a major historical change.
II. The Starting Conditions
4. Statistical information on the economic conditions in Eastern Europe is incomplete
and distorted. If one were to believe the international statistics prior to the revo-
lutions in 1989, some of the Eastern European countries fared pretty well. For
instance according to CIA data [1989], income per head in East Germany ($12,634)
was estimated to be the same as the average of the EC countries in 1988, and it
was supposed to be not too different from West Germany ($14,192). UN sources
[ 1989] also show a similarly high income per head in the ex-GDR. And the widelyquoted Summers and Heston [ 1988] data put East Germany on a par with Sweden
(for all figures, see Table Al in the Appendix).
5. In the meantime, we have become aware that these data were false. World Bank
[1990] data (see Table 1), probably the most reliable in the field, indicate that
income per capita in Hungary ($2,460) and Yugoslavia ($2,320) in 1988 reached
half the level of Greece ($4,800). Poland's income per capita ($1,860) only matches
half of the level of Portugal ($3,650). It is not true that living conditions in the
rich former socialist countries like the GDR and Czechoslovakia were on a par with
less advanced nations in Western Europe. Moreover, environmental damages were
ignored, medical facilities were inappropriate, housing was poor and social security
insufficient.













Source: World Bank [1990].
6. The economic conditions in the region of the former GDR and in Eastern Europe
vary between the countries, but some features are common; namely,
- the inefficiency of production and a partially obsolete capital stock,
- a distorted trade structure oriented at the COMECON and not at the international
market,
- product qualities that do not satisfy international demand, so that firms are not
competitive,
- a "marked deterioration in the efficiency of capital investment and slower growth
in productivity" in the 80's [Institute for International Finance, 1990]. The
ICOR, the incremental capital output ratio, rose, indicating that more investment
was necessary to produce an additional unit of output,
- a fall in productivity growth rates from 5 percent in the 70's to 2 percent in the
80's [Institute for International Finance, 1990],- the poor environmental record, Czechoslovakia and the GDR having, for in-
stance, the highest per capita sulfur dioxide emissions in the world.
Even the policy domain, where centrally planned economies are expected by some
to outperform market economies, namely, income distribution, did not yield the
intended results. "Post-tax income distribution in the Soviet Union, for example, "
- in contrast to Churchill's dictum - "does not appear to be more egalitarian than
in many Western European countries" [International Monetary Fund, 1990, p. 68].
The Economist has pinpointed the situation: "McDonalds, an American fast-food
company, opened its first Russian establishment, in Moscow's Pushkin Square. A
hamburger plus accessories costs six roubles, which is roughly $10 at the official
exchange rate; more to the point, it is half a day's wages for most workers. A
queue trails back and forth across the square; a wait of four hours is typical. An
afternoon queueing in the cold to spend a mornings's pay on a hamburger. That is
as good a measure of economic failure as any. "
III. Three Major Areas of Reforms
7. Many books have been written on the issue of how one can transform a capi-
talist economy into a communist one and - ironically - since Karl Marx even more
books have been written on reasons why one should do so. But we have no cook-
book for the transition from a socialist economy to a market economy. The basic
question is: How do you transform a socialist centrally planned economy into a
market economy, where individual preferences count and where firms react to
prices?
Obviously, central planning has to be given up and the economic system has to be
completely revised. The basic mechanism of allocation must be the market and
prices must be oriented at scarcities, especially at scarcities in the world markets.
It is only in this way that the opportunity cost of production can be clearly
evaluated.
Steering the economy by means of prices already has quite a few implications. It
implies that government trading monopolies, both on the import and the export
sides, have to go. At the same time, with national markets open to the world econ-omy, there will be arbitrage between the commodity markets in different countries
if the prices of tradeable commodities differ too much. Consequently, subsidies for
tradeables have to be given up.
8. Prices also require decentralization and the autonomy of organizational subunits
of the economy, i.e., of households and firms. That is that they must be free to
react to supply and demand and to the forces of the market. At the same time,
they must be fully responsible for their economic decisions, so that they will no
longer need to be bailed out by the government. This means that economic losses
have to be internalized to the firm and that the "soft-budget" constraint for firms
[Kornai, 1980] has to be turned into a hard-budget constraint. Firms must be
liable for their economic decisions. One aspect of this is that they can go bankrupt
if they are not viable.
9. Not only commodity markets but also factor markets must be steered by prices.
This holds for land, labor, natural resources and capital. Especially the capital
market is crucial for a market economy. In the capital market it is determined
whether it is worthwhile to put financial funds into a firm. If a firm is viable, it
can attract capital and it can expand. If it does not succeed in attracting ad-
ditional funds and if profits are negative, it will eventually have to disappear from
the market. The capital market provides evaluation of firms and in this way con-
trols management. It is an important steering mechanism for a capitalistic economy.
10. There are three major areas of reform which are all interlinked but which
nevertheless can be distinguished: the institutional infrastructure, monetary
stabilization and real adjustment on the microlevel, that is, in the firms.
The institutional infrastructure relates to the rules to be followed, to what the
Freiburg school calls the "Wirtschaftsordnung," to the legal system, to contract
law, to company law (including the rules holding for jointstock companies), to the
two-tier banking system, to the independence of the Central Bank, to property
rights and to the delineation of government and the private sector. In short, this
is the economic constitution of a country.
One of the most important elements of the institutional infrastructure is property
rights. Property rights define the rules for using scarce goods and resources.
They provide the crucial institutional device by which decisions can be de-centralized. The economic unit that enjoys the benefits of a decision should also
bear the opportunity costs. Property rights are a device for satisfying this con-
dition. They privatize the benefits and the costs of economic decisions. It should
be noted that the equality of marginal benefit and marginal costs only holds for
the marginal transaction in a market. In a market with many buyers and many
sellers, there will always be buyers with a higher willingness to pay than the
market price, thus receiving a consumer's surplus. Similarly, there are suppliers
on the supply side who are prepared to sell at a lower price, thus receiving a
producer's surplus. The producer's and consumer's surpluses indicate the ad-
vantage of a transaction to the parties concerned.
It need not be stressed that private property is an important motivational force for
exploiting the best use of a resource, and, together with the market mechanism, it
is the driving force in the search for new information, including new technology.
Property rights and competition are thus an exploratory device in the sense of
Hayek [1968]. Property rights are also an incentive to have a long-run outlook
with respect to using resources. Transferability of a property right gives a capital
value to the property, and the capital value can be cashed in by the next genera-
tion. Thus, property rights represent an intertemporal link between generations
even without bequest. Of course, this intertemporal role of property rights clearly
depends on the certainty of the property rights.
11. Macroeconomic or monetary reform is the second area of reform in the Eastern
European countries. A stable and convertible currency is a mandatory precon-
dition for the functioning of the price mechanism and for efficient allocation. If
price level stability is violated, it is difficult to introduce or stick to the con-
vertibility of the home currency as a precondition for capital inflows and the
exploitation of comparative advantages. Moreover, there is a risk that eventually a
run-away inflation must be controlled with a price stop; then the market mechanism
will not function properly any more, and the whole reform attempt may have been
in vain. Political obstacles to a new reform will have increased.
From the institutional side, monetary stability requires establishing a two-tier
banking system with private banks and an autonomous central bank. Moreover, it
implies that government expenditures can no longer be financed by printing
money. With respect to governments, a new tax system has to be developed and a
new social security system including unemployment insurance has to be designed.Monetary stabilization is not only linked with the financing of the government, but
it is also influenced by wage policy, because the changes in wages define the
maneuvering space of the monetary authorities. Thus, the arrangement for the
labor market and the definition of the role of trade unions are intertwined with
monetary stabilization.
12. Countries starting from a monetary overhang, like Poland, with a hyperin-
flation rate of 650 percent in 1989, and the USSR, presently with a monetary
overhang and a de facto price rise, face the problem that structural and in-
stitutional reform must be combined with a reduction of nominal absorption in order
to get a stable price level. Reducing absorption means squeezing consumption and
government spending. Tradeables must become more expensive so that production
of tradeables increases and internal demand is reduced (expenditure switching)
and so that there is an excess supply of tradeables for exports.
13. The third area of reforms relates to the microlevel. Markets imply competition,
which means that government monopolies have to go and a new organizational
structure has to be found for firms that were monopolies. As a rule, a whole
industry was organized as one firm with a clearly segmented market. For instance,
shipbuilding was organized as an industry. A publisher of children's books was
not allowed to publish an economics text. Each industry had a neatly protected
market for itself. This was made sure by delineating the industry's market from
other sectors. Moreover, the Eastern European philosophy of international speciali-
zation from above implied that national industries were also protected from inter-
national competitors.
IV. The Restructuring and Privatization of Firms
14. The restructuring of existing firms consists of three aspects that are all
interlinked. First, how can new, smaller organizational units be delineated?
Second, how can existing firms be made efficient and economically viable? Third,
in which way can firms be privatized?
The dismantling of the state-owned enterprises implies the splitting-up of firms
into smaller units. Organizational subunits of state monopolies should have the
option of declaring themselves as legally independent units. Moreover, an explicit10
government policy should force existing monopolies to dismantle themselves into
smaller organizational units or dissolve them by law. This approach was followed in
the German case, where 316 "Kombinats" were turned into 8,000 legally inde-
pendent firms. Breaking up government monopolies into smaller legally independent
units does not yet solve the problem of making these new units efficient. But a
smaller unit is easier to handle and more flexible.
15. Making existing firms efficient requires a spectrum of measures ranging over a
wide area. First, a firm has to establish the product or product set it can sell in
the market. The firm may have to establish a new product. Second, firms have
tended to be as self-sufficient as possible, producing their own inputs in order
not to depend on delivery from other suppliers. Thus, the production of inter-
mediate inputs may have to be given up. This may also apply to the repair de-
partment, to the transportation division and other functions. Third, new pro-
duction technology will be necessary in most cases requiring investment. Fourth,
marketing is required and a distribution system (and service system) has to be set
up. Moreover, there are many other aspects of firm's adjustment, including organi-
zational changes, introducing new management techniques and, in most cases,
reducing the work force.
16. Shaping new organizational units is intermingled with the issue of ownership of
firms and control of managers. Firms should be privatized. The organizational
structure of industry and the ownership of firms are the core problems for struc-
tural adjustment and for a dynamic change of the socialist economies in a
Schumpeterian sense. The big issue is by which institutional arrangement privati-
zation can be achieved. In Poland and Hungary, 90 percent of industry are in
state hands. In Czechoslovakia, expropriated small firms will be given back to the
previous owners in a "small privatization" plan. In a "large privatization" plan, the
existing larger firms will be privatized.
17. Privatization has to provide a mechanism by which private owners are estab-
lished. It must make sure that
- decisions in the firms are dominated by economic considerations,
- a dynamic process of structural change is possible,
- capital will be allocated to the best use, and
- managers are controlled by the capital market.11
Additionally, privatization can be used to establish a new middle class of property
owners and raise people's interest in their stake in firms.
Apparently, solutions to the privatization issue will differ depending on the
weight put on the different targets. Moreover, solutions may vary with respect to
the time they require.
18. The most comprehensive goal of privatization is to privatize firms and to
establish a new ownership class. In this case, the old firms must either be given,
or sold, to the population. A specific aspect would be using privatization to reduce
the monetary overhang. In any case, ownership titles must be transferable in
order to establish a capital market. Moreover, foreigners must be allowed to buy
these transferable titles so that new (foreign) capital can be invested in the
existing firms. In the initial allocation or sale of property titles, part of the
ownership titles may have to be open to foreign investors.
19. Giving company shares exclusively to the workers of a firm has the disad-
vantage that
- the risk of employment and the risk of capital loss is centered on one group,
implying rent seeking of that group in the political arena,
- workers will dominate the economic decisions of the firm and will impede
structural change,
- workers tend to be interested in quick payouts and do not have an interest in
providing capital,
- the total wealth is not equally distributed to the whole of the population.
The Yugoslav experience supports these concerns. In any case, if company shares
are given to the workers, the shares should be transferable so that a capital
market can quickly be established. This is equivalent to giving an option to
workers to acquire shares and make the option transferable. In order to attract
foreign capital, it is recommended to allow a portion of shares to be purchased by
foreigners.
20. Governments are tempted to combine privatization with structural policy. Such
an approach will fail because structural policy will attempt to smoothen the
transition for individual firms, protecting employment by subsidizing old lines of12
production and by intervening in the market mechanism that has to be created.
People should be protected by social policy and not by strucutral policy. Clearly,
privatization should not be mixed with structural policy.
Care must be taken that institutional arrangements for privatization do not per-
petuate government ownership (e.g., giving property titles to communities), that
big financial trusts with political interests (and rent seeking) are not established
and that the managers are not controlled by workers' councils, but by the capital
market.
21. In terms of organizational problems, a privatization agency can be set up,
such as the German Treuhand charged with privatizing the firms (and in the case
of Treuhand, the additional highly questionable role of making firms efficient). In
a way this approach of establishing a privatization agency has the potential ad-
vantage of separating the policy arena from privatization; however, there will be
strong political pressures on Treuhand. Thus, the organization charged with
privatization should be independent.
22. A possible procedure would be to establish several holding companies for the
whole country's government property in order to have competition among the
holding companies [ Kostrzewa, 1989; Siebert and Schmieding, 1990]. The allocation
of existing firms to the holding companies must be done on a random basis. The
holding companies should be forced to be dissolved within a specific time.
23. The holding company would have the right to define new units, but existing
parts of firms with some organizational autonomy would have the right to initiate
the process of privatization, for instance, by finding a buyer or using a manage-
ment buyout for a specific organizational subsystem. In order to prevent a sellout,
the sale should be announced publicly; if within a time span of 2 months, no other
bidder would show up, the privatization deal would go through. Possibly, outsider
investors could be granted the right to initiate a bid that would then be tested in
an auction.
24. A voucher system may be a way to reduce the power of the privatization
agency. The voucher is an ownership title to all government-owned firms. In this
approach a voucher is given to each citizen. The voucher must be transferable.
Once new firms have been formed, their shares are exchanged for vouchers. In13
this case, privatization is obtained by distributing vouchers, and there is pressure
on the privatization process from below, because voucher owners eventually want
to have shares. The role of the privatization agency can be reduced if markets can
be established in which the price of shares in units of vouchers is established.
25. The voucher system attempts to distribute the assets equally among the popu-
lation. An alternative approach is to privatize firms by selling shares right away.
Then the firm receives an injection of capital, new owners come into existence and,
eventually, new management will be introduced by the new owners. This procedure
cannot be followed if the selling of shares is intended to reduce the money over-
hang and if new management has to be introduced quickly in order to turn around
the firm.
26. The conditions for privatization vary among countries. In the German case, it
is important to privatize quickly and to use privatization as a vehicle to attract
private capital quickly. Contrary to the transition in Eastern Europe, East Ger-
many has a common currency with West Germany, it has the same institutional
setting and therefore a large potential for massive capital inflows which must be
tapped.
Methods of privatizing firms can be ordered on a continuum. Access of firms to the
stock market establishes a reliable evaluation of the capital value of a firm by
many buyers, including a market judgement on economic viability. In the German
case, this would, in principle, represent a possibility for some viable East German
firms, but access to the stock market requires many preconditions that are not
fulfilled. Moreover, it is a time-consuming process. On the other extreme of the
continuum, there is "informal selling" as a way to privatize, with one party, or
only a few parties, on the buyer's side. Here the advantage is that informal
selling does not require much time, but the buyer's side of the market is too
"thin," giving rise to the possibility of a too low selling price. These two ways of
privatizing firms - the stock market and informal selling - are two extremes on a
continuum. In between is a formal' bidding process like the one used in mergers
and acquisitions in the US. This seems to be the appropriate approach for Treu-
hand.
27. In the German case, establishing a semi-stock market for East German firms by
means of a less formal stock exchange admission regulation (Borsenzulassungs-Ver-14
ordnung) is an interesting possibility. This would mean that firms have easier
access to the capital market, and they can privatize themselves without needing
the help of Treuhand. Apparently, this way is only possible when firms are some-
what viable. An issue may be that this procedure makes it easier for the old
management to stay in power.
28. An important aspect of restructuring industry is the creation of new firms. As
a matter of fact, it is more important to have new firms than to restructure the
old ones. New firms will soak up workers from the inefficient old firms and will
help to solve the unemployment problem. Thus, conditions must be established that
allow new firms to come into existence. Market entry barriers should be abolished,
location space must be supplied and finance must be available especially for the
new and the small firms. Thus, the semi-stock market should be open for the new
firms in Eastern Germany as well. It is worthwhile to recall that the majority of
employment occurs in small firms, 78 percent of employment in manufacturing
industries in Germany is in firms with less than 500 employees.
V. The J-Curve of Output and Employment
29. In the adjustment of output and employment, the inefficiencies of the old
planning system will be clearly revealed. From the German and the Polish experi-
ence, we know that the transition from a planned to a market economy is asso-
ciated with a specific development in output and employment - a J-curve in output
and employment with a dip, a valley or a deep gorge - where output and employ-
ment will fall first and then start to rise. The shape of this curve is not exactly
known, but it is relevant for the political economy of transition. Clearly, the
shape of the J-curve depends on the inefficiency of the existing firms, on the
speed and methods of privatization, on the speed with which new firms come into
existence and on the conditions of the process of restructuring.
30. The statistical measurement of the J-curve is loaded with difficulties. The
transition implies a sizable change in the price system, and indices of production
use the obsolete quantity weights of the pre-reform period. For instance, for data
on East Germany's industrial output, the quantity weights for 1985 are applied.
Moreover, statistics on the planning period may be deliberately distorted, and15
gross and net values of production may be falsely specified. Consequently, indices
of production may not be meaningfully compared.
31. So far, we only can observe the falling branch of the J-curve. In the East
German case, industrial output fell by 50.9 percent from August 1989 to August
1990 (Figure 1) despite subsidies of an unprecedented magnitude. The data sug-
gest that the fall in industrial output has come to a stop.
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Source: Gemeinsames Statistisches Amt [ 1990].
Unemployment rose from 140,000 in June 1990 to 361,000 in August and 589,000 in
November 1990. The number of people on short-time work amounted to 656,000 in
June and 1.8 million in October and November (Figure 2). Moreover, net emi-
gration rose from 12,000 per month in May and June to 28,000-31,000 in July,
August and September.16
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(a) 1989 labor force, including public sector employment, accounts for 9.6 mill,
persons. - (b) Share of labor force that accounts for 70 p.c. of total emigrants.
- (c) Data on commuters are based on rough estimations.
Source: Gemeinsames Statistisches Amt [1990].
VI. Sequencing
32. The sequencing of the reform steps is a major issue. It is heavily debated
whether the transition can be done in a gradual process or in a big leap forward
where the crucial reforms take place as a shock to the system, either simultane-
ously or in relatively short intervals.
33. As a rough rule, the institutional infrastructure has to be established first
(contract and company law, property rights, two-tier banking system, etc. ). As a
second step, the basic microreforms must follow. The microreforms may be split up
into two different aspects: the start of the microreforms and their implementa-
tion. The first process includes decentralizating the economy (autonomous decision17
making by the firms that in this stage are not yet in private hands), introducing
markets instead of central planning, and allowing free market entry for new firms.
The first process must be connected with, or closely followed by, the most easily
realizable component of the second process, namely, the freeing of prices in the
most important goods markets. At the same time, the country must be opened to
the world economy and subsidies for tradeables must be abolished. The other
components of the microreform implementation process, such as introducing the
capital market, demonopolizing the firms (e.g., dismantling the "Kombinats"),
privatizing the firms and having new firms enter the market, will require more
time (Figure 3).
Monetary stabilization cannot be too distant from the microreforms. There are two
different approaches, one approach is to reduce the monetary overhang before (or
simultaneously with) the microreforms. Then monetary stabilization precedes the
microreforms. The other approach is to consider inflation as a temporary option for
reducing the monetary overhang before stabilization bites. In this case, prices are
freed when a monetary overhang still exists. But inflation involves the risk of
giving reason to wage increases, of distorting the allocation mechanism, eventually
requiring a price stop and consequently leading to a failure of the transition
process itself. If that is a real danger, monetary stabilization cannot be separated
too much from the microreform.
As already stated, monetary stabilization is linked to the institutional aspect of the
independence of the central bank and to the rules of government finance, includ-
ing the design of the tax system. Finally, the real adjustment on the microlevel of
firms, such as demonopolization, privatization and creating new firms, will take
very much time.
34. In Figure 3, an attempt is made to show the analytical structure of the basic
reforms in the transition process. Except for the restructuring of firms which must
be thought of in terms of years (and depending on the country, may involve one
or two decades), all the reforms must be close to each other in time, and here we
should think in terms of months (and not years). The relative position of specific
measures in terms of time depends on the options chosen, as was explained with
respect to monetary stabilization. Some measures such as the involvement of the
specifics of contract laws can take time, too, but the basic rules of contract law
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35. This picture of transition can be made more specific by studying the se-
quencing possibilities in some detail. There is the question of whether a se-
quencing possibility with respect to some sectors exists [Edwards, 1989]. Thus,
some non-tradeables (housing, some transportation) can still be subsidized. How-
ever, the option used by China [ Lai, 1990] of first only introducing the market
economy for agriculture, then for crafts and small industry and eventually for the
whole economy is no longer viable for a country like the USSR, because such an
option would be too time consuming. People are no longer willing to wait.
36. A sequencing in regional terms may be discussed in the case of the USSR,
with individual republics such as the Baltic States undertaking a more intensive
reform in a big jump. Politically, this regional approach may be considered as an
aspect of the inevitable unravelling of the Soviet empire, and historical analogies
to the British and French Empires may come to mind. Such an approach, though
possibly promising in purely economic terms, bears the risk of political conflict and
instability, with de Gaulle's memento that the USSR has twelve Algerias ahead.
37. Another specific aspect of sequencing relates to opening up the economy to the
international division of labor. One question is to what extent the transition to a
market economy may be coupled with import duties and other import restraints.
However, the political economy of protection shows that import restraints tend to
stay. Industries that are inefficient due to the planning system will have a chance
to organize themselves in pressure groups when tariffs and other forms of pro-
tection are introduced. The Latin American experience of import substitution and
the protection of potential export sectors suggests that it is not advisable to use
"temporary" protection in the transition to an open economy. With respect to the
convertibility of the home currency, full "internal convertibility" is instrumental in
giving credibility to a monetary stabilization program. A strict monetary stabili-
zation program aiming at price level stability and the hard-budget constraint for
firms requires convertibility.
38. Four arguments can be put forward in favor of a big jump and of the Polish
approach: "You cannot cross a chasm in two jumps. "
- Some of the reforms are strongly interlinked and must be done more or less
simultaneously.20
- For investment to be undertaken, the reforms must be credible. This means they
must be irreversible. Gradual reforms do not prevent the expectation that the
planning system and the nomenklatura will come back. Consequently, reforms
must be realized in a discrete way.
- The population, having been exposed to many empty promises in the past, is no
longer willing to wait.
- The reforms must catch the attention of people, change their expectation and
behavior. This cannot be done easily with a gradual approach.
VII. Integrating the New Market Economies into the European Economic Space
39. Of the three major areas of reform - institutional infrastructure, monetary
stabilization and real adjustment on the microlevel - two are already solved in the
German case, at least in principle. These are the institutional infrastructure,
which was taken over from West Germany, and the monetary stability, which has
been supplied by the monetary union. So East Germany is a special case of tran-
sition of socialist economies into a market economy with only the third problem left:
real economic adjustment including privatization. Moreover, East Germany was
instantaneously integrated into the EC.
40. Eastern European countries do not have as favorable conditions as East
Germany:
- They have to develop their own institutional infrastructure, whereas East Ger-
many has adopted the West German constitution and the basic economic laws.
- They have to solve the problem of foreign debt (Poland $46 bill., Hungary $19.7
bill. ), whereas in the East German case, foreign debt has been taken over by
the federal government of Germany.
- They have to create their own hard and convertible currency through a hard
stabilization program.
- They will not have the advantage of sizable transfers.
Institutional change and structural adjustment therefore will be much more difficult
in the Eastern European countries than in the ex-GDR.21
41. The state of reform differs between the countries. Poland, so far, has followed
a big-leap strategy, including a strict stabilization program to fight an inflation
rate that reached 650 percent in 1989. Meanwhile the inflation rate is down to 4
percent per month in 1990; the zloty is stable relative to the dollar, and shelves
are full. But industrial output in the first six months of 1990 fell below, the level
of the previous year, namely, by 30 percent. Unemployment has increased. The
privatization of firms and the restructuring of industry seems to be dragging due
to a strong influence of the worker's councils. Moreover, Poland has a convertible
currency debt of $46 bill. For the future prospects, the extent to which the new
Polish government sticks to the transition strategy will be crucial.
42. In Hungary, slow reforms have been going on for 22 years. Tentative reforms
in the past and the traditional openness towards the West have put Hungary into a
privileged position in the East. In contrast to the USSR, the liberalization in the
agricultural sector has guaranteed a sufficient supply of food. A fully democratic
government is another important asset. However, industrial reorganization has
hardly started yet. Presently, 80 percent of all prices are free and a lack of
competitiveness in the state sector is obvious. State-owned companies rely heavily
on subsidies. The government will have to make great efforts to enforce privati-
zation and cut industry subsidies. Also, the debt burden of about $20 bill, has to
be coped with. The small trade surplus in 1990 could be increased if the country
had access to the European agricultural market. The high internal debt has fueled
inflation and driven interest rates to a figure of 33 percent, and the budget
deficit has to be reduced. Nevertheless, one can count on a high level of entre-
preneurship due to a well preserved private enterprise tradition. Today, 20 per-
cent of the economy is in private hands and almost 2,000 joint ventures have been
arranged.
43. Czechoslovakia seems to be attempting to establish the institutional infra-
structure first. Czechoslovakia was one of the countries with the most advanced
industry in the COMECON. The industrial sector accounted for 60 percent of the
country's GDP. But fading intra-COMECON trading relations must soon be replaced
by taking part in the international division of labor. For example, two-fifths of all
exports used to go to the USSR in exchange for oil imports. This kind of trade
has broken down almost completely.22
The "small privatization" has already started; retail stores, restaurants and smaller
business units have been put up for auction. The government will have to with-
draw subsidies for noncompetitive sectors. Resulting unemployment during the
period of transition could well be substantial. In the long run, the geographical
advantage of being in the very center of Europe will play a dominant role. The
neighboring markets of Austria and Germany will fuel export demand, thereby
raising the level of employment.
44. In contrast to other European countries, there is a lack of reform in the
USSR. Obviously, one fraction of the leading communist party still sticks to the
idea of introducing market elements into the socialist system to arrive at a
so-called "socialist market. " But working out a concept for a third way will be in
vain. Another group is in favor of the Shatalin plan, which regards private
property as the fundament of a successful market economy. According to this "500
day plan, " agricultural cooperatives must be decentralized and privatized imme-
diately to avoid further food shortages or even famines. Shatalin advocates privati-
zation and price deregulation at the same time. It will take a decade and more to
reform the extremely distorted industrial structure. First steps have been taken to
divert military spending and investment in heavy industries to consumer goods
producing sectors.
45. There is a tremendous economic potential in Eastern Europe in terms of natural
resources, land, labor and a market with a population of 136 mill, in Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia and 290 mill, in the
USSR. However, the output of the six Eastern European countries is less than 10
percent of the output of the European Community. "The combined convertible
currency exports of the seven countries was only three-quarters of the exports of
Hong-Kong" [Institute of International Finance, 1990, p. 8]. The convertible cur-
rency trade of these countries accounted for less than 40 percent of their total
trade.
So far, this economic potential has not been used. The region has had its own
trade philosophy, which has attempted a specialization among the COMECON by
political coordination. Tractors would be produced in country x, railroad cars in
y, buses in country z. It was a specialization from above and along the traditional
Ricardian lines of Portuguese wine for English cloth and Russian oil against Czech
machinery. Government contracts were the vehicle of specialization. Contrast this23
to the philosophy where international trade develops from below with a multitude of
decentralized and individual contracts and where individual preferences play a
role. Wine is exchanged for wine. A substantial part of trade is intra-industry
trade. Also compare the Eastern European trade philosophy of self-sufficiency of
the COMECON with export-orientation and the openness of the successful Asian
countries.
46. In the American economic literature there is the concept of the new frontier:
the expansion of the economic space over the Mississippi and beyond the Rockies,
a concept that derives from the American historical experience and that was ex-
tended to outer space by John F. Kennedy. The economic reforms in Eastern
Europe can represent such a new frontier. The paradigm to be applied to this
investment scenario cannot be attributed to Lord Keynes but to Joseph A.
Schumpeter. The huge productivity gap between West and East Germany and
between Western and Eastern Europe signals potential productivity gains. When the
reforms succeed, there will be a positive supply shock for the world economy. The
real rate of return will rise and capital will flow to Eastern Europe, where new
production lines will open up. Eastern Europe can be the growth locomotive for the
world economy in the 90's.
47. Economic reform in Eastern Europe must become a success. Just imagine the
political implications of a failure: the market economy would then lose its
credential, and we may be back to an undemocratic, populist, or authoritarian
system. There is a risk of tremendous political instability. Finally, some people are
vexed by the idea that an economic disappointment in Eastern Europe would see a
new wave of migration from the East to the West - a Volkerwanderung, a mass
migration. Relative to such a mass movement of European dimensions, the migration
of East Germans to West Germany would appear minimal.
48. Even if there is no political instability in Eastern Europe, there will be a
poverty border along the Oder in five years when East Germany has caught up.
Moreover, there is a poverty border along the Danube. The difference in income
per capita between Germany ($18,480) and Poland ($1,860) is 10:1 [World Bank,
1990]. With European borders no longer being equipped with machine guns, such
income differences are not tenable. The situation is only sustainable if income per
Compare Alvin Hansen according to Higgins [1968].24
head in Poland rises. Western Europe has a tremendous responsibility to help. It is
of paramount importance that Eastern European countries receive financial support
from Western Europe in order to ease their finanical constraints.
49. If Western Europe closes its markets to Eastern Europe, as in agriculture,
textiles and other protected areas, the economic opportunities in Eastern Europe
will be dimmed; the incentive to emigrate will be increased. Thus, protecting
Western European agriculture against the Australian or Brazilian farmer is different
from protecting it against the Polish and Hungarian peasant. The Brazilian farmer
cannot migrate to the EC. Thus, the protectionist politician will harvest the im-
plication of his policy in terms of immigration problems. The events in Eastern
Europe have completely changed the conditions for agricultural policy in Europe in
the future. The opportunity costs of protection will become apparent in terms of
migration.
50. The issue arises to what extent and in which forms the EC can open up to the
Eastern European countries. It is an absolute necessity to open the EC to the
countries in Eastern Europe, in some form or another. We can envision free trade
agreements between the EC and individual countries for specific sectors similar to
the 1973 free trade agreement with EFTA in manufacturing. Conceivably, some
Eastern European countries may form another economic union that will be associated
with the EC.
51. Western Europe seems to be developing a protectionist tendency. This relates
to European agricultural policy but it also relates to sectors that so far were not
protected, as for instance the automobile sector, where national import quotas will
be elevated on a European level. There is a risk that the world economy will move
away from multilateralism and that the paradigm of bilateralism and the concept of
a triad, with strategic behavior as the dominant characteristic, will take over. It
is somewhat ironic that the liberalization process in Eastern Europe is discovering
the merits of the free market and is moving away from a philosophy of planned
specialization among countries by international cooperation, whereas new theoreti-
cal, albeit naive, approaches of some international economists from the US
[Brander and Spencer, 1985] seem to suggest a new era of managed trade and
harmonization of strategic trade policy. Our aim must be to develop a multilateral
institutional arrangement for the world economy in which economic decisions are
decentralized.25
52. Institutional and economic change both in Eastern and in Western Europe is a
tremendous opportunity for a positive change in the world economy. There are
benefits from free trade for the West and far more for the East. There is the
chance of a larger economic space in Europe, and in addition there is a peace
dividend for both the West and the East which will allow a reduction of military
expenditures and a redirection of expenditures to other uses. But most of all there
is a freedom dividend for the people in Eastern Europe which will allow them to
enjoy individual liberty and political freedom, but also to introduce a new stimulus
to economic activities and eventually to turn the change in Eastern Europe into a
Schumpeterian event. As David Hume once said: "The increase of riches and
commerce in any one nation, instead of hurting, commonly promotes the riches and
commerce for all its neighbours. "
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